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Comment
Anti-Stalking Legislation: A Comparison
of Traditional Remedies Available for
Victims of Harassment Versus California
Penal Code Section 646.9
Reports of stalking1 have become increasingly common in the
United States.' Commentators predict that approximately five per-
cent of women in the United States will be victims of unwanted
pursuit at some time in their lives.' In 1990, following the fatal
shooting of actress Rebecca Schaeffer and the murders of four
other southern Californian women,4 the California Legislature res-
ponded by passing the nation's first anti-stalking law.5 Numerous
1. The crime of stalking has been defined as the willful, malicious, and repeated following
or harassing of another person, in addition to the making of a credible threat with the intent to place
that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a)
(West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(3) (West Supp. 1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
2. See Elizabeth Ross, Problem of Men Stalking Women Spurs New Laws, CHRISTIAN So.
MONrroR, June 11, 1992, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File (noting that the
problem of stalking has gained increased attention due to society's growing awareness of domestic
abuse as a serious crime); see also World News Tonight With Peter Jennings (ABC television
broadcast, Aug. 11, 1992) [hereinafter World News Tonight], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Transcripts File (noting there are an estimated 200,000 stalkers in the United States).
3. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking but Some Experts say Measures
are Vague, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File
(quoting Park Dietz, a clinical psychiatrist, who conducted a major study on stalking).
4. See Sonya Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast, June 8,1992) [hereinafter Sonya
Live], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts File (reporting that all four murders of the
southern Californian women occurred within a period of a month and a half and that each woman
had obtained a temporary restraining order and communicated to her family, friends, and police that
she thought she was going to be killed).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PtULIC SAFETY,
REPORT ON SENATE BILL 2184 (1990) (noting that increased stalking of celebrities and the murders
of five Orange County women highlighted the need for anti-stalking legislation in California); see
Gary Spencer, State Tightens Penalties for Stalking, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 20, 1992, at 1, available in
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other states have followed California's lead by enacting anti-
stalking laws similar to California's provision.6
Prior to the passage of these anti-stalking laws, a victim's usual
remedy against a harasser was to obtain a restraining order or
injunction aimed at keeping the stalker away from the victim.
7
Unfortunately, these remedies were often inadequate to protect vic-
tims of harassment.8 It is not surprising, therefore, that many
people have welcomed anti-stalking legislation in an effort to aid
victims.9 However, civil libertarians, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union, are concerned with how these laws will be applied
and have been apprehensive in endorsing them. 10
This Comment provides an overview of the traditional remedies
available to victims of harassment and of the new anti-stalking
laws in effect in some states, which are aimed specifically at pro-
tecting victims of stalking. Part I describes the stalking phenom-
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File (noting that the catalyst for stalking laws in states other than
California has come primarily from women and domestic violence organizations because in those
states, unlike in California, few victims of stalking are celebrities); see also infra notes 150-158 and
accompanying text (discussing section 646.9 of the California Penal Code).
6. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111(4) to (6) (1986 & Supp. 1992); 1992 Conn. Acts 92-
237 (Reg. Sess.); 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(2) to (3) (West Supp. 1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5(1)(a) to (b) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(a) (Supp. 1992);
720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-7.3(a)(1) to (2) (1992); 1992 Iowa Acts 190; 1992 Ky. Rev. StaL
& R. Serv. 443 (Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(A) (West Supp. 1993); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 43(a) (Law Co-op. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(1) (Supp. 1992); NEa. REV.
STAT. § 28-311.03 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a)(1) to (3) (Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 1173(A) (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEM. LAWS § 11-59-2(a) (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1070(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODMIsE LAws ANN. § 22-19A-1 (Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(1) to (3) (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(2) (Supp. 1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Michie Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(a) (1992).
7. See infra notes 87-119 and accompanying text (discussing restraining orders and
injunctions to prevent stalking).
8. See infra notes 81-86, 161-171 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacies of
traditional civil remedies in protecting harassment victims); supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text
(discussing the cases of four southern California women who were murdered by stalkers even though
they had obtained injunctions and filed complaints with the police).
9. See Arthur I-Iigbee, American Topics, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 6, 1992, News,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File (noting that anti-stalking laws are supported by
victim's rights advocates who see such laws as additional deterrents to the kind of behavior that often
precedes more violent acts).
10. See Spencer, supra note 5, at I (reporting that the American Civil Liberties Union has
stated that it will watch to see how anti-stalking laws are implemented to ensure they are not used
to prohibit constitutionally protected activities).
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enon and illustrates several case histories." Part I explores the
advantages and disadvantages of traditional remedies for victims of
harassment12  and explains California's anti-stalking provision,
California Penal Code section 646.9. 3 Finally, Part III discusses
the validity of the various arguments that have been asserted
against California Penal Code section 646.9.14
I. THE STALKING PHENOMENON
A. Case Histories
Most incidents of stalking fall into one of three categories:
domestic violence, work-place harassment, or stalking of a famous
person. 5 Undoubtedly, the most widely publicized cases are those
involving celebrities. In fact, it was the murder of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer which prompted the enactment of California's anti-
stalking law.16 More recent examples include actress Justine
Bateman, whose stalker threatened suicide in her presence, and
actor Michael J. Fox and his wife, actress Tracy Pollan, who were
threatened by a woman who sent them almost 6,000 harassing and
threatening letters in one year. 7 Although these celebrity cases
attract much public attention, stalking is far from being a behavior
directed exclusively at celebrities.'
The most commonly occurring cases of stalking are associated
with domestic violence and usually involve former spouses or
11. See infra notes 15-61 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 62-149 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 150-158 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 159-236 and accompanying text.
15. See Ross, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing common situations in which stalking occurs).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); supra notes 4-5 and accompanying
text (explaining the catalyst of California's anti-stalking law).
17. Faye Mayo, Address to the California Assembly Committee on Public Safety (July 3,
1990) (on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
18. See Puente, supra note 3, at 9A (noting that 38% are average citizens). Only 17% of
stalking victims are highly recognized celebrities, and 32% are less widely known entertainment
figures. Id.
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lovers.' 9 Not only are these more common, but police have indi-
cated that stalking cases involving domestic relationships have the
highest potential for violence.2" Statistics reveal that nine percent
of all violence against women is done by husbands, thirty-five per-
cent by ex-husbands, and thirty-two percent by boyfriends or ex-
boyfriends.21 In the case of stalking specifically, forty-seven
percent of stalkers know their victims either as ex-spouses, ex-
lovers, or former bosses.Y The following three cases are illus-
trative of the problem and of the inadequacy .of traditional
remedies.
1. Case #1
The first person ever charged under California Penal Code
section 646.9 was Mark Bleakley. Bleakley was found guilty of
stalking his ex-girlfriend, Leslie Wein, for two months.
24
Bleakley's reign of harassment began shortly after Wein ended
their two-year relationship.' At first, "I Love You" notes and
bouquets of roses appeared mysteriously on Wein's bed.26 Next,
Bleakley moved items around in Wein's room to show that he had
escaped her security system and that he had been in her room
while she was not home.27
Bleakley's mind games quickly escalated into an obsession.28
He followed her wherever she went, appearing in Wein's rearview
mirror when she was driving, sometimes even in rental cars to con-
19. See World News Tonight, supra note 2. See generally Ross, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that
the vast majority of domestic violence occurs after a couple separates).
20. World News Tonight, supra note 2.
21. Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992) [hereinafter
Nightline], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts File.
22. Puente, supra note 3, at 9A.
23. See Michael Connelly, Ex-Boyfriend Jailed Under 'Stalking' Law, L.A. TIMEs, June 10,
1991, at BI, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File.
24. Id.
25. James Quinn, Man Pleads No Contest in 'Stalking' Case, L.A. TIWEs, July 23, 1991, at
B3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File.
26. Norma Meyer, Ex-Boyfriend Nabbed in State's 1st 'Stalking' Case, NEWs PILOT, Aug. 12,





fuse her.29 He also made threatening telephone calls, flattened
Wein's tires twice, poured acid on her car, and stole her dog from
her backyard.30 On one occasion, Bleakley shattered the wind-
shields of cars belonging to Wein's friends and wrote Wein's name
across the broken glass in red lipstick.31
Even though Wein had obtained a temporary restraining order,
Bleakley's harassment did not cease. 2 Wein made twenty police
reports before Bleakley was finally arrested and charged under
California's new anti-stalking law, Penal Code section 646.9.33
2. Case #2
Erin Tavegia was only fifteen years old when a forty-nine year-
old man began stalking her.34 Every day while Tavegia and her
friend walked to school, the man followed them in his car.35 He
sat outside of Tavegia's house and waited for her.36 Tavegia con-
tacted the police repeatedly over fourteen months but was told that
the police could not help her because the man was not breaking the
law.37 Finally, however, the stalker pled guilty to breaching the
peace. 8 Nevertheless, Tavegia claims the stalking experience has
changed her entire life.39 She remains afraid and will forever be
looking over her shoulder, and she doubts that she will ever be able




32. Connelly, supra note 23, at B6; see infra notes 87-119 and accompanying text (discussing
temporary restraining orders).
33. Id.
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3. Case #3
Sam Cooper began stalking Ms. Jimmie Breeding after
Breeding terminated their relationship.41  Cooper followed
Breeding, blocked her driveway, and put harassing letters in her
mailbox. 2 On one occasion, Cooper confronted Breeding at her
home and struck her on the head with a hammer, causing severe
injuries.43 Although Cooper pled guilty to attempted murder, he
was still free on bail for nearly a year, during which time he con-
tinued to harass Breeding.' As is common with many stalking
cases, Breeding had previously begged for, but was denied, police
protection because Cooper had not yet broken the law.45
B. Typical Stalker Profile
In general, most stalkers are males,46 coming from all eth-
nicities and ages, and from a variety of social and family back-
grounds.47 Many are intelligent with a history of inadequate heter-
osexual relationships.48 They are often motivated by fantasies of
intimate relationships with their victims. 49 However, to many
stalkers, love means possession. Stalkers do not see the object
of their obsession as a real person, but rather, see that person as a
thing to be possessed. 1





46. Cheryl Laird, Stalking: Laws Confront Obsession That Turns Fear into Terror and Brings
Nightmares to Life, THE HOUSTON CHRON., May 17, 1992, Lifestyle, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Newspapers File.
47. Id.
48. See John C. Lane, Threat Management Fills Void in Police Services, THE POLICE CHIEF,
Aug. 1992, at 28 (noting that the experiences of the Threat Management Unit of the Los Angeles
Police Department indicate that some stalkers are of above-average intelligence while others are
socially maladjusted).
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Many stalkers suffer from mental disorders. 2 These disorders
tend to fall into three categories: erotomania, love obsessions, and
simple obsessions. 3 Erotomania is a condition where persons
falsely believe that the victim is in love with them.' A love
obsession is a condition in which a person is a stranger to the vic-
tim but, because of the obsession, mounts a campaign of harass-
ment in order to make the victim aware of the person's pre-
sence.55 Finally, a simple obsession involves a person, known to
the victim as an ex-spouse, ex-lover, or former boss, who begins
to harass the victim.5 6 Of those who suffer from these disorders,
an erotomaniac is almost twice as likely to engage in stalking.57
Regardless of their mental condition, stalkers, at least initially,
do not desire to hurt their victims but simply want to possess
them. 8 However, when the victim does not respond as the stalker
desires, the stalker becomes angry.59 This is typically when the
52. Puente, supra note 3, at 9A (suggesting that some statistics show that more than 90
percent of stalkers suffer from mental disorders).
53. See Michael A. Zona, M.D., et al., A Comparative Study of Erotomania and Obsessional
Subjects in a Forensic Sample, in AM. ACADEMY OF FORENsIC SCi. (forthcoming July 1993) (on file
with the Pacific Law Journal) (discussing the characteristics of erotomania, love obsessions, and
simple obsessions).
54. See Zona, supra note 53 (defining erotomania as the delusional belief that one is
passionately loved by another, usually a person of higher socio-economic status or a public figure,
and that the person would return the affection if not for some external influence). Persons afflicted
with erotomania often will go to great lengths to contact the person of their delusion. Id. They believe
that the actions taken by the other person are specifically intended for them and reject any evidence
to the contrary. Id. While the prognosis for such persons is poor, some clinical anecdotes suggest that
newer objects may replace older ones. Id. See also Puente, supra note 3, at 9A (indicating that 9V%
of stalkers suffer from erotomania).
55. See Zona, supra note 53 (noting that persons suffering from love obsessions begin taking
steps to make their existence known to the victim sometimes due to a belief that the victim will love
them if only given a chance); see also Puente, supra note 3, at 9A (noting that 43% of stalkers suffer
from love obsessions).
56. See Zona, supra note 53 (distinguishing a simple obsession from erotomania and love
obsessions because the victim is known to the person suffering from a simple obsession as a
neighbor, acquaintance, or lover). In the case of simple obsessions, the obsessional activities begin
after the relationship has gone bad or there is a perception of mistreatment by the other person. Id.
The person usually begins to harass the victim in order to rectify the situation or to seek retribution.
Id. See also Puente, supra note 3, at 9A (noting that 47% of stalkers experience simple obsessions).
57. See Zona, supra note 53 (noting that 43% of those with erotomania, 21% of those with
love obsessions, and 28% of those with simple obsessions are likely to engage in stalking).
58. Laird, supra note 46, at 1.
59. Id.
1951
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harassment begins, which is often in the form of telephone calls
and notes of "love" or "hate." 60 When the victim rejects the
stalker, the blow to the stalker's self-esteem and the realization that
the stalker cannot have what the stalker desires most, often leads
to violence.61
II. TURNING TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM FOR RELIEF
FROM STALKING: TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
The psychological distress suffered by many harassment victims
and the potential for physical harm necessitates effective legal
sanctions. 62 However, harassers most often utilize methods such
as telephone calls, letters, shadowing, and direct communication,
none of which involve any legally prohibited human interaction.
63
As a result, the legal system has experienced difficulty dealing with
all but the most obvious forms of harassment. 64 For that reason,
new remedies must enable authorities to distinguish harassment
from ordinary human contacts, while providing relief only in situa-
tions where harassment does in fact occur.65 Before examining the
need for the newly passed anti-stalking legislation, it is first neces-
sary to consider traditional remedies that have been available to
harassment victims and their inadequacies in protecting those vic-
60. Id.; see Zona, supra note 53 (citing the results of a study in which all erotomania subjects,
81% of love obsessional subjects, and 34% of simple obsessional subjects wrote to their victims; on
the other hand, 85% of erotomania subjects, 40% of love obsessional subjects, and 65% of simple
obsessional subjects made telephone contact).
61. Laird, supra note 46, at I (stating that stalkers are likely to become angry when the victim
does not respond to them in the manner they wish); see Zona, supra note 53 (noting that only 15%
of persons suffering from erotomania, 12% of those with love obsessions, and 22% of those with
simple obsessions engaged in face-to-face contact with their victims). In the Zona study, those
suffering from simple obsessions miade threats to the victims more frequently than those suffering
from erotomania or love obsessions: 65%, 57% and 18%, respectively. Id.
62. AJ.R., Comment, A RemedialApproach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REv. 507, 513 (1984)
(explaining that many victims reach a "breaking point" where they can find few areas in which to
feel secure; they become nervous and then paranoid, and they go to great lengths to change their
situation).
63. See id. (noting that the methods of harassment are as wide-ranging as the forms of human
contact); supra notes 17-45 and accompanying text (illustrating the types of contact made by
harassers).
64. AJ.R., supra note 62, at 513.
65. Id. at 513-514.
1952
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tims. Yet, it should be noted that in some situations, such as where
the offender is mentally unstable or where the police are not dedi-
cated to enforcing the law against the offender, police intervention
may do no more than simply aggravate the offender and increase
the offender's potential for violence.66 Traditionally, the principal
ways a harassment victim could obtain relief was to seek civil tort
remedies or to file a complaint against the harasser and encourage
the state to seek criminal sanctions. 67
A. Tort Remedies Available in California for Victims of Har-
assment
In certain instances, the harassment may be of such a degree or
frequency so as to cause a substantial interference in the victim's
life. 68 A victim of harassment may bring a civil suit against a har-
asser and may seek damages, or an injunction, or both.69 Speci-
fically, the tort actions of invasion of privacy and intentional
66. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant John Lane, Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles
Police Department (May 20, 1993) (commenting that police intervention does not, in the typical case,
cause the offender's behavior to escalate into violence absent some mental instability on the part of
the offender or inadequate police involvement); see infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text
(discussing the limitation of anti-stalking legislation).
67. Linda M. Gunderson, Comment, Criminal Penalties for Harassment, 9 PAC. LJ. 217
(1978) (qualifying the availability of traditional remedies by explaining that because harassment cases
often involve strong emotions of the harasser, the threat of civil liability is inadequate to cease the
harassment, and thus, criminal remedies have been made available); see infra notes 68-158 and
accompanying text (discussing the availability of tort and criminal remedies).
68. Gunderson, supra note 67, at 217; see A.J.R., supra note 62, at 507 (indicating that
stalking by strangers or ex-lovers can generate so much anxiety and fear of imminent physical harm
that victims radically alter their lifestyles to avoid further contact); see also World News Tonight,
supra note 2 (reporting that one stalking victim moved to a secret location and refused to go outside
in an attempt to avoid her stalker).
69. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708 (West 1979) (providing that every person is bound to abstain
from injuring another person, or infringing upon any rights of that person). But see Steven M. Cook,
Comment, Domestic Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A Survey and Suggestions for
Reform, 1983 U. IL. L. REV. 261, 263, 267 n.39 (1983) (explaining that a tort action against a
spouse is not allowed in almost half of the states, not including California, due to interspousal tort
immunity).
1953
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infliction of emotional distress (LIED) may provide some relief to
harassment victims.70
Because a harasser creates an unwarranted interference in the
victim's life and intrudes upon the victim's solitude or seclusion,
harassment amounts to a tortious invasion of a victim's right to pri-
vacy.7 A person's right to privacy includes the right to be left
alone.72 Thus, the interest protected is a person's mental tran-
quility.
73
To establish a cause of action for invasion of privacy, the vic-
tim must show that the defendant's intrusion was unreasonable and
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.74 Unwarranted
intrusion has been defined as any conduct which causes mental suf-
70. AJ.R., supra note 62, at 517 (noting that a cause of action for nuisance or trespass has
limited application to harassment claims because it requires proof of the defendant's physical invasion
or interference with the plaintiffs property which is often absent from the harassment context). In
addition, a civil assault action may be brought against a harasser for which the victim can recover
damages. See infra notes 134-142 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of an assault
action).
71. See Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (listing four types
of invasions of privacy: (1) public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff, (2) portrayal of the
plaintiff in a false light, (3) appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's
advantage, and (4) intrusion upon the plaintifs seclusion or solitude, or into his or her private
affairs); see also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 85, 291 P.2d
194, 196 (1955) (asserting that California courts recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy);
Gunderson, supra note 67, at 221-222 (acknowledging that California courts have not expressly
recognized intrusion as a basis for an invasion of privacy cause of action, but that case law indicates
such an extension will be approved).
72. See Schwartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal. App. 2d 799, 805,51 Cal. Rptr. 767,770 (1966) (slating
that the right of privacy is a recognized justiciable right in California and has been defined as the
right to be left alone).
73. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that
California courts' willingness to allow relief from unreasonable penetrations of mental tranquility
based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is indicative of a trend to protect that
same interest in invasion of privacy cases); Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 86, 291 P.2d at 197
(explaining that the main concern of the cause of action in a privacy case is mental and subjective
injury).
74. See Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68,71 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding
that the right to privacy is a question of fact to be determined by the norm of the ordinary person
and only where the intrusion goes beyond the limits of decency does liability accrue); see also
Emerson v. J.F. Shea Co., 76 Cal. App. 3d 579, 592, 143 Cal. Rptr. 170, 177-78 (1978) (stating that
a cause of action for invasion of privacy exists when the defendant has performed an unreasonably
intrusive investigation of the plaintiff, and the test is what is objectionable or offensive to the
reasonable person).
1954
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fering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensi-
bilities.7" Therefore, as the intrusion need not be physical, a suit
for invasion of privacy is a viable cause of action for victims of
harassment.
Similarly, victims of harassment can seek a cause of action for
LED. To prove HED, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's
conduct was outrageous, 76 that the defendant intentionally or reck-
lessly caused the plaintiff's emotional distress,7" that the plaintiff
in fact suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and that the
emotional distress was actually or proximately caused by the defen-
dant's outrageous conduct.7 The emotional distress suffered by
the plaintiff may include any highly unpleasant mental reaction
such as fright, grief, or anger, and the victim need not suffer any
physical injury.
71
Because physical injury to the plaintiff is not an element for a
cause of action for LIED, the conduct of harassment may be suffi-
ciently outrageous to form the basis for a successful suit for IBED.
75. See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1969) (upholding the plaintiff's
claim for invasion of privacy where the defendant corporation caused him to be shadowed and to
receive threatening telephone calls); W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS [hereinafter KEEMN] § 117, at 855 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that some courts have held that
making persistent and unwarranted phone calls constitutes an invasion of privacy).
76. Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which exceeds all bounds of conduct usually
tolerated in a civilized community. See Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593, 595
P.2d 975, 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 206 (1979); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 46, cmt. d
(1965) (noting that particular conduct exceeds all bounds of what is usually tolerated in a civilized
community when recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse
resentment toward the actor and lead the person to exclaim "outrageous").
77. People act intentionally if they desire to cause consequences of their acts or believe the
consequences are substantially certain to result. See generally Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11
Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1974). One acts in reckless disregard when one
knows that such emotional distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from one's conduct.
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (Seaton), 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224
(1975) (stating that recklessness connotes action which is insensate, heedless or negligent); see also
Gunderson, supra note 67, at 224 (defining reckless disregard).
78. See Cramin v. Krebbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (listing the elements for
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Cervantez, 24 Cal. 3d at 593, 595
P.2d at 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (discussing the prima facie elements of a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
79. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396-97, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 90 (asserting that in California, a plaintiff may recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress for mere emotional distress alone without any resulting disability); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. j (1965).
1955
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In fact, some types of harassment are similar to certain activities
which have been held to be outrageous and unreasonable in the
more typical context of IED cases. For example, some cases have
held that investigative surveillance is outrageous conduct sufficient
to sustain a suit for IED.80 Likewise, harassment can occur from
a distance and need not involve any direct physical harm.
Even if the harasser's conduct is sufficient to provide the plain-
tiff with a cause of action for IIED or invasion of privacy, the
intangible nature of these causes of action has meant that neither
has provided an adequate remedy for victims.8 The intangible
nature of these torts stems from their categorization as "dignitary"
harms.8 2 Dignitary torts are primarily concerned with harm to
intangible values such as peace of mind, rather than pecuniary or
physical harm.83 As a result, courts have experienced difficulty in
measuring the emotional distress suffered by plaintiffs ade-
quately.8 Even if a court is able to place a dollar value on the
harm suffered by the plaintiff, the injury caused by dignitary torts
cannot be made whole by money damages.8 5 In addition, the
potential for monetary liability is not an effective deterrent against
harassment if the perpetrator is seriously determined to carry out
80. See, e.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 310, 313, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 860, 861-62 (1976) (remanding a case in order to determine if an investigator's surveillance
of a claimant was unreasonable and outrageous); Nobel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d
654, 659, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272 (1973) (citing with approval cases holding an investigator's
conduct as unreasonable and outrageous where the investigator trails or shadows the plaintiff or
conducts an investigation in a frightening manner).
81. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacies of civil tort
actions).
82. Gunderson, supra note 67, at 224 (defining a dignitary tort as one recognizing the value
of emotional tranquility).
83. See Clark v. Celeb Publishing, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (using
California law to award plaintiff damages resulting from invasion of privacy and noting that
California law allows damages for embarrassment, humiliation, and other forms of mental anguish);
see also Gunderson, supra note 67, at 219, 224 (noting that intimidation may be more damaging to
the victim than actual physical harm). One study has shown that women who receive anonymous,
threatening telephone calls typically exhibit more anxiety than those who have been victims of
serious physical abuse. Id. at 219.
84. AJ.R., supra note 62, at 514. See Gunderson, supra note 67, at 224 (noting that although
it is difficult to measure monetary damages for dignitary torts, recovery is not precluded).
85. Gunderson, supra note 67, at 224 (stating that the legal remedy for dignitary torts is not
compensation for the loss suffered, but is a representatibn of social vindication of the human spirit).
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the perpetrator's course of conduct, as is often the case. 6 Thus,
the victim may also look to civil injunctions for additional relief.
Civil injunctions are a third option available to victims of har-
assment.' Although injunctions are civil in nature, their violation
can result in both civil and criminal contempt sanctions.88 Thus,
they provide a civil remedy to deter what is essentially criminal
behavior.89 In addition, injunctions may be easier for victims to
obtain than criminal remedies because injunctions are not encum-
bered by constitutional protections, such as due process of law or
proof beyond a reasonable doubt?0
A common type of injunction is a temporary restraining order
(TRO) which restricts specified acts by the defendant until a
hearing, at which the plaintiff must show cause as to why a prelim-
inary injunction should be granted.91 This preliminary injunction,
if granted, remains effective until the merits of the case are deter-
mined by a court.92 At a hearing on the merits, a court may
decide to grant a permanent injunction which remains in effect
86. Id. (commenting that where monetary damages do not effectively deter harassment, the
victim may look to other civil remedies).
87. See Gary Richard Brown, Comment, Battered Women and the Temporary Restraining
Order, 10 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 261 (1988) (stating that restraining orders are available in 47 states
and the District of Columbia). See generally CAT. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 525 (West Supp. 1993)
(defining an injunction as a "writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act"); Janice
L. Grau, Restraining Order Legislationfor Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 703,
725 (1982) (describing that the two goals of restraining orders are to provide a remedy for victims
and to reduce the conduct the restraining orders prohibit).
88. See Grau, supra note 87, at 719-23 (listing civil and indirect criminal contempt, arrest, and
misdemeanor charges as possible sanctions).
89. See Cook, supr, note 69, at 271-72 (discussing the use of temporary restraining orders
as provided by domestic abuse legislation to deter criminal behavior in several different jurisdictions).
90. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
Li. 1325, 1329, 1331 (1991) (noting that the Sixth Amendment's requirement of trial by jury and
appointment of counsel, and the Fifth Amendment's due process requirements of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, need only apply in criminal cases); infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text
(comparing civil and criminal remedies).
91. See Neumann v. Moretti, 146 Cal. 31,33,79 P. 512, 513 (1905) (noting that a temporary
restraining order is an injunction that is granted for the time between application for a preliminary
injunction and the day on which the plaintiff is to show cause).
92. See Hartsif v. Wann, 139 Cal. App. 2d 119, 121, 293 P.2d 65, 66 (1956) (defining the
purpose of a preliminary injunction as preserving the status quo until there can be a hearing on the
merits); Doudell v. Shoo, 159 Cal. 448, 455, 114 P. 579, 582 (1911) (noting that the purpose of a
preliminary injunction is to cover the interval before the entry of a final decree).
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indefinitely.93 Once an injunction is granted it may not be dis-
obeyed.94 In order to show that the defendant has violated an
injunction, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either knew
of the violation or had reason to believe the defendant was in vio-
lation.95 If a plaintiff can show that the defendant violated the
injunction, some statutes provide for civil and criminal contempt
remedies, or misdemeanor charges, or both.96
California has a TRO statute specifically for victims of harass-
ment.97 California Civil Procedure Code section 527.6 provides
that a victim of harassment may seek a TRO which prohibits har-
assment.98 The TRO remains effective for up to fifteen days."
After a plaintiff files a petition, the defendant may file a response
explaining, excusing, justifying, or denying the harassment allega-
tion.' °° However, if the judge finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that unlawful harassment exists, the judge will issue an
injunction prohibiting the harassment for up to three years. 10 1
93. If a permanent injunction is denied, the effect of a preliminary injunction also comes to
an end. Shahen v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 46 Cal. App. 2d 187, 188, 115 P.2d
516, 517 (1941). If a permanent injunction is granted, the preliminary injunction merges with it and
ceases to exist. Webber v. Wilcox, 45 Cal. 301, 302 (1873).
94. See Morton v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 65 Cal. 496,497,4 P. 489, 490 (1884)
(stating that an injunction must be fairly and honestly obeyed and not defeated by tricks on the part
of those bound to obey it).
95. See Hutton v. Superior Court of San Francisco City and County, 147 Cal. 156, 160, 81
P. 409, 410 (1905) (noting that some knowledge of the defendant is essential to prove a willful
violation of an injunction).
96. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.60) (West Supp. 1993) (referring to section 273.6 of
the California Penal Code which makes any willful disobedience of a temporary restraining order a
misdemeanor); see also Elizabeth Topliffe, Comment, Why Civil Protection Orders are Effective
Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders are Not, 67 IND. LJ. 1039, 1046
(1992) (noting that enforcement provisions are important to ensure that defendants follow injunctions
ordered against them).
97. See CAt. CiV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(a) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing a person who has
suffered harassment to seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting harassment).
98. Id. The plaintiff must provide the court with an affidavit which shows to the court's
satisfaction: (1) reasonable proof of harassment of the plaintiff by the defendant; and (2) the plaintiff
would suffer great or irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. Id. at § 527.6(c).
99. Id. at § 527.6(c)-(d) (providing that a hearing will be held within 15 days of the filing of
a petition).
100. Id. at § 527.6(d).
101. Id. Such injunctions may not last for more than three years. Thereafter the plaintiff may
apply for a renewal of the injunction. Id.
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These injunctions, even though specifically designed to protect
victims of harassment, are still inadequate for many reasons. First,
injunctions may be difficult for a victim to obtain because judges
grant them only in limited circumstances. 0 2 For example, a judge
may grant an injunction where pecuniary compensation is inade-
quate,10 3 or where such compensation would be difficult to ascer-
tain."° In addition, a judge may grant an injunction if the plain-
tiff can prove that irreparable harm would be caused if it were not
granted.'05 Second, the plaintiff must be able to sufficiently des-
cribe the conduct which the injunction will restrain. 6 If an
injunction is too broad or too vague it will be unenforceable. 107
The terms of injunctions must be certain, so that defendants will be
able to determine what conduct is restricted.!0 8 Third, even if the
102. See Grau, supra note 87, at 706 (noting that many statutes which contain prerequisites to
obtaining a TRO against domestic violence actually serve as barriers to court access). In the case of
domestic violence TROs, most statutes allow relief for physical abuse and threatened physical abuse,
but completely omit any mention of recovery for psychological abuse. Id. at 706-707.
103. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 526(4) (West Supp. 1993). The plaintiff cannot merely allege
that no other remedy exists, but must plead and prove that actual irreparable injury will result unless
an injunction is issued. E.H. Renzel Co. v. Warehouseman's Union, 16 Cal. 2d 369, 373, 106 P.2d
1, 3 (1940).
104. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(5) (West Supp. 1993) (allowing for an injunction where
it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate
relief).
105. Id. at § 526(2) (West Supp. 1993); see Lorenz v. Waldron, 96 Cal. 243, 250, 31 P. 54,
56 (1892) (stating that in order to obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show a reasonable
probability of suffering harm); Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco v. Shipman, 69 Cal.
586, 593, 11 P. 343, 346 (1886) (noting that injunctions may not be granted merely to allay a
plaintiff's fears and apprehensions, but are only appropriate when a plaintiff can show a reasonable
probability of real injury). But see Nicholson v. Getchell, 96 Cal. 394, 396, 31 P. 265, 266 (1892)
(conceding that a plaintiff need not show that injury is inevitable in order to be granted injunctive
relief).
106. See Brunton v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 202,205, 124 P.2d 831, 833-34 (1942) (holding
that a party cannot be held guilty of contempt for violating an injunction that is uncertain or
ambiguous, just as a party may not be held guilty of violating a criminal statute that fails to give the
party adequate notice of the prohibited acts); Gunderson, supra note 67, at 225 (noting that
injunctions against harassment must withstand the same level of constitutional scrutiny as a proposed
criminal statute against harassment).
107. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 644, 651, 83 Cal. Rptr. 35, 40 (1970)
(noting that it exceeds the power of a court to forbid an act in terms so vague that people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application).
108. See Griffin v. Lima, 124 Cal. App. 2d 697, 700, 269 P.2d 191, 193 (1954); Wheeler v.
Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 202, 209, 255 P. 275, 278 (1927) (commenting that a defendant must
be able to from the injunctive order what behavior is being proscribed). A court may clarify
1959
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 24
plaintiff obtains an injunction, it may be too short in duration, thus
allowing the defendant to resume the unlawful conduct.'0 9
In addition to these three major problems, there are many other
difficulties with injunctions. Compliance is not guaranteed because
injunctions, like other remedies, are only effective against people
who understand what injunctions are and decide to comply with
them."0 Many stalkers are not sufficiently deterred because they
have mental disorders and cannot understand injunctions and thus,
cannot follow them."' Even if stalkers do not suffer from mental
disorders, harassers often possess extremely strong desires, and an
injunction will often not deter them." 2
Even if the assailant does understand the significance of the
injunction, it does not always provide the victim with adequate pro-
tection because there are ways to avoid violating its terms while
still continuing the harassing conduct." 3 Enforcing injunctions is
difficult because the police are unable to accompany the victim con-
tinuously in order to ensure the defendant's compliance."4 More-
over, many stalkers actually measure the distance at which they are
toremain from the victim and then move slightly beyond that point
to continue the harassing behavior." 5 As a result, the harasser is
able to continue harassing the victim but cannot be arrested for
contempt because the distance requirement set by the injunction is
being observed. 1 6 Finally, injunctions are most effective against
people who are not extremely violent." 7 Yet, many stalking cases
uncertainty and ambiguity by looking to findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the purpose of the
litigation. City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 509, 514, 241 P.2d 243, 246 (1952).
109. See, e.g., CAL. Cr¢. PRoc. CoDs § 527.6 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a temporary
restraining order against harassment shall not be effective for more than 15 days, unless otherwise
modified by the court).
110. Crier & Company: Terrorized by Stalkers (CNN television broadcast, March 11, 1992)
[hereinafter Crier & Company], available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts File.
111. Id.
112. Gunderson, supra note 67, at 228.
113. Ross, supra note 2 (noting that some domestic abusers begin stalking their victims in
response to, the issuance of a restraining order).
114. See generally Gunderson, supra note 67, at 226.
115. Morning Edition: Anti-Stalking Laws Considered by Virginia (National Public Radio radio
broadcast, March 10, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts File.
116. Id.
117. Topliffe, supra note 96, at 1045 (discussing the inadequacies of injunctions).
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fall into the domestic violence category involving ex-spouses or ex-
lovers.118 It is these cases that police say have the highest
potential for violence. 9 Therefore, injunctions will not be very
effective in protecting those victims who need the most protection.
Where civil remedies fail, another alternative for harassment
victims may be criminal remedies.
B. Criminal Statutory Remedies
Criminal statutes provide harassment victims with two major
advantages over civil remedies. 2 First, criminal statutes provide
victims with the benefit of police protection.12 1 Second, criminal
statutes serve the function of incapacitating particular offenders for
a longer time than civil injunctions. There are three basic crim-
inal statutes available to a victim of harassment in California: a
telephone and general harassment statute, an assault statute, and a
statute prohibiting the making of threats.
1. Harassment Statutes
Many states provide specific protection against telephone har-
assment." A number of these statutes prohibit the making of
118. World News Tonight, supra note 2.
119. Id.
120. Gunderson, supra note 67, at 224-29 (discussing the inadequacies of injunctions and civil
tort actions).
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 697 (West 1985) (stating that police officers may prevent public
offenses); see Gunderson, supra note 67, at 228-29 (noting that where criminal statutes are
applicable, they allow the police to intervene immediately). But see A.R., supra note 62, at 507
(maintaining that victims of harassment often find criminal remedies nonexistent).
122. See AJ.R., supra note 62, at 515 (comparing criminal and civil remedies). Compare CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for a felony charge in cases where the
defendant commits the crime of stalking while a temporary restraining order is in existence or where
the defendant is convicted of stalking twice within seven years) with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
527.60) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for a misdemeanor charge if the defendant violates a
temporary restraining order).
123. See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text (describing various forms of telephone
harassment statutes).
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threats or the use of obscene language. 24 Others prohibit anony-
mous or repeated telephone calls. 125 Some prohibit the deliberate
refusal to terminate the telephone connection. 126 Many prohibit
false statements concerning injury or death to the recipient or mem-
bers of the recipient's family.' 27 Finally, several statutes contain
"catch-all" provisions for other types of telephone harassment.2 8
In addition to telephone harassment statutes, many states have
enacted criminal statutes directed at various other forms of harass-
ment. 29 Some statutes prohibit communicating by telegraph or
124. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(4) (Supp. 1992); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2921(A)(1) (Supp. 1992); CAl. PENAL CODE § 653m(a) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-111(1)(e) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1312(1) (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39(2) (Michie 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4113(I)(a)
to (b) (Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:285(A)(1),(4) (West Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 506(1)(A) (West 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.090(1)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-17-07(1)(a) (Supp. 1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21(A)(2),(4) (Baldwin Supp.
1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.065(1)(c) (Supp. 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5504(a)(1) (Supp. 1992);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.230(1),(3)
(Supp. 1993); see also AJ.R., supra note 62, at 523-24 (commenting that various statutes reflect
differing degrees of sensitivity to the many forms of harassment).
125. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-8(b)(1)(a) (Supp. 1992); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(3)-
(4) (Supp. 1992); Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921(A)(1) (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-
111(1)(e) to (g) (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39(4) (Michie 1992); HAw. REV. STAT. §
711-1106(1)(d) (Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214113(d) (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. §
14:285(A)(2) (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 506(1)(D) (West 1983); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.090(3)-(4) (Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4(11) (Supp. 1992); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07(1)(b) to (c) (Supp. 1991); OHio RBV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21(A)(1)
(Baldwin Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5504(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
308(a)(2) (1991); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
9-201(1)(1) (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.230(2) (Supp. 1993).
126. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § I1.61.120(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39(4)
(Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:285(A)(3) (West Supp. 1993); TMm. PENAL CODE ANN. §
42.07(a)(5) (West Supp. 1993).
127. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 166.065(1)(b) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
308(a)(3) (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(b)(1)(b) (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-
111(1)(f) (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183(a)(3) (Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-
1106(1)(c) (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE §
708.7(1)(a) (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080(1)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 644:4) (Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(2) (Consol. 1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-17-07(1)(c) (Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5504(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-308(a)(2) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-201(l)(a) (Supp. 1992).
129. See infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (citing and describing various criminal
harassment statutes in different states).
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mail in a manner likely to harass, annoy, or alarm. 3' Others pro-
hibit abusive or obscene language or gestures.' A number of
statutes expressly forbid persons from following others in public
places."' Finally, some states have enacted "catch-all" provi-
sions, similar to those in telephone harassment statutes, that pro-
hibit a person from engaging in any course of conduct that inten-
tionally alarms or annoys another person. 3 3 However, harassment
statutes are not the only criminal remedies available to harassment
victims.
2. Assault Statutes
Assault statutes provide an alternative criminal remedy to har-
assment victims who have not been inflicted with physical harm.
To commit an assault, a defendant must attempt to use force
against the victim and must have a present ability and opportunity
130. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(b)(1)(a) (Supp. 1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2921(A)(1) (Supp. 1992); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1311(2) (1991); IND. CODE § 35-45-2-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.080(1)(a)
(Baldwin Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 609.795(1)(3) (Supp. 1993); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.090(1)(1)
(Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07(1)(a) (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065(1)(c)
(Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308(a)(1) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106(1) (1990).
131. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(a)(1)(b) (Supp. 1992); ALASKA STAT. §
11.61.120(a)(1),(5) (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-208(a)(2),(4) (Michie Supp. 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-9-111(1)(b),(g) to (h) (Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(1) (1991);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106(1)(b),(d) (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070(1)(b)
(Baldwin Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4(II)-(IIl) (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §
166.065(1)(a)(B) (Supp. 1992); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
132. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921(A)(2) (Supp. 1992); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 5-71-
208(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111(1)(c) (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 525.070(1)(c) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121A(c)(1)-(3) (1992); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2709(2) (1990).
133. See, e.g., ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921(A)(3) (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-
208(a)(1),(5) (Michie Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE § 708.7(3) (Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
525.070(1)(a),(d) (Baldwin Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 506-A(1) (West Supp.
1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.571(a)-(b) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065(1)(a)(A) (Supp. 1992);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2709(1) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.46.020(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. § 813.125(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1992); see also AJ.R., supra note 62, at 523, 525 (discussing
nontelegraphic harassment statutes and noting that all states have statutes criminalizing telephone
harassment, and several states have statutes prohibiting abuse through the use of the mails).
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to carry out that threat immediately."M No actual physical contact
is necessary. 5 Physical contact is not a required element for an
assault cause of action because assault statutes recognize the vic-
tim's interest in freedom from apprehension of harmful or offen-
sive contact with the victim's own person. 3 6 However, courts
have required the plaintiff's apprehension to be that which would
normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person. 3 7 The
reasonableness of a victim's belief depends on whether the defen-
dant had a present ability to cause harm to the victim.138 There-
fore, because the standard is an objective one, a person who was
not actually put in fear of harmful contact may bring suit for
assault if a reasonable person would have been afraid.1 9
This present ability requirement relates back to the original
justification behind assault statutes which was the likelihood that
certain incidents might result in breaches of the peace. 14° How-
ever, a defendant cannot commit an assault when the defendant is
too far from the plaintiff to make contact because the possibility
134. See CAL PENAL CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1993) (defining assault as an unlawful attempt,
in addition to a present ability to commit a violent injury on another person); see also State v.
Ingram, 74 S.E.2d 532, 535 (N.C. 1953) (defining an assault as some overt act or attempt, or the
unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury
to another).
135. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that the defendant only make
an unlawful attempt to commit a violent injury on the plaintiff); see also Lowry v. Standard Oil Co.,
63 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 146 P.2d 57, 60 (1944) (holding that pointing an unloaded gun at another in
a threatening manner is sufficient to cause fear of personal injury unless the other person knows the
gun is unloaded).
136. See Lowry, 63 Cal. App. 2d at 7, 146 P.2d at 60 (stating that a civil action for assault is
based upon an invasion of the right to live without being put in fear of personal harm); see also
KEETON, supra note 75, at 43.
137. See Ingram, 74 S.E.2d at 536 (stating that a plaintiff's fright is insufficient by itself to
constitute an assault in the absence of circumstances which would put a person of ordinary firmness
in fear of immediate injury); see also KEETON, supra note 75, at 44.
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring an assailant to have a present
ability to commit a violent injury on the person of another). It is not the subjective belief of the
victim that determines if an assault has been committed, but whether the assailant had the present
ability to commit a violent injury. People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 544, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346,
347 (1970).
139. See People v. Wilson, 119 Cal. 384, 51 P. 639 (1897) (holding that the victim need not
be placed in fear to constitute the offense of assault with intent to commit sodomy).
140. KEETON, supra note 136, at 43.
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for a breach of peace is minimal.141 Thus, it seems that assault
statutes will not adequately protect victims of harassment because
unlawful harassment may be committed from a distance through
the use of telephones or the mail.142 In such situations, the present
ability element of assault statutes is absent.
3. Statutes Prohibiting Threats
A third type of statute is one which specifically prohibits the
making of threats.143 Section 422 of the California Penal Code
prohibits a person from willfully making threats to commit a crime
which would result in great bodily injury to another person.144
While the defendant must have the specific intent that the statement
be taken as a threat, the defendant need not intend to actually carry
out that threat. 45 The threat must be immediate and specific so
as to convey to the victim an immediate possibility of execution of
the threat.' 46 Finally, the victim must reasonably sustain fear for
personal safety, or the safety of the victim's immediate family. 47
Unfortunately, like other traditional remedies, section 422 may also
be inadequate to protect victims of harassment because prosecutors
and judges have failed to take it seriously and to provide adequate
enforcement.14' Thus, many states have enacted anti-stalking
laws.
149
141. But see People v. Yslas, 27 Cal. 631, 634-35 (1865) (noting that it is not indispensable
to the commission of an assault that the defendant be within striking distance of the victim at any
time).
142. See supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text (providing three case histories which
illustrate the various techniques used by stalkers to harass their victims).




147. Id. (defining immediate family as any spouse, parent, child, any person related by kinship,
or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within six months prior, regularly
resided in the household).
148. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant John Lane, Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles
PoliRe Department (May 20, 1993); see infra notes 172-190 and accompanying text (comparing
sections 420, 422, and 646.9 of the California Penal Code).
149. See supra note 6 and infra notes 150-158 and accompanying text (discussing section 646.9
of the California Penal Code).
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C. California's New Anti-Stalking Law: Section 646.9 of the
California Penal Code
The California legislature enacted section 646.9 of the
California Penal Code in 1990 as a new remedy for harassment
victims.150 Ten convictions were obtained under section 646.9
within the first year after its enactment. 5' Section 646.9 provides
that the crime of stalking occurs when a person willfully, mali-
ciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and
makes a credible threat'52 with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.'53 If a person
violates section 646.9 when the victim has already obtained a tem-
porary restraining order against the defendant, the law allows for
either a misdemeanor or felony charge."5 Similarly, a second or
subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a prior con-
viction of stalking against the same victim is punishable either as
a misdemeanor or as a felony.
55
The primary advantage of this statute is that a victim no longer
has to suffer physical harm before the police may arrest the assail-
ant.'56 A stalker need only communicate a threat of bodily injury
and then follow or harass the victim twice before police can make
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). Before 1990, the crime of stalking did not
exist in California, or in any other state. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the
catalyst for California's law).
151. Nightline, supra note 21.
152. See CAL PENAL. CODE § 646.9(t) (West Supp. 1993) (defining credible threat as a threat
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the threatened
person to reasonably fear for that persons's safety or the safety of that person's immediate family).
There must be a threat of death or great bodily injury to the person. Id.
153. Id. § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993). A violation of California Penal Code § 646.9(a) may
be punishable as a misdemeanor subjecting the stalker to imprisonment in a county jail for not more
than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. Id. Such a violation may also be
punishable as a felony requiring imprisonment for 16 months, two or three years, or a fine up to
$10,000. id. § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1993).
154. Id. § 646.9(b),(d) (West Supp. 1993).
155. Id. § 646.9(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1993); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant John Lane,
Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles Police Department (May 20, 1993) (noting that most cases
are prosecuted as felony cases).
156. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); Nightline, supra note 21.
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an arrest.'5 7 Because the reach of California Penal Code section
646.9 is far beyond that of traditional assault statutes, it has been
challenged by some commentators on various grounds, including
claims that it is unconstitutional due to the void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines under the United States Constitution.' 58
HI. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
SECTION 646.9 FOR VICTIMS OF HARASSMENT
As of the date this article was written, no court had published
a decision regarding California Penal Code section 646.9, although
a few convictions had been obtained. 159 When asked what might
be the reason for the lack of judicial interpretation of California
Penal Code section 646.9, Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney
Andrew Diamond suggested that it is probably because such chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the statute would fail.' 60 In an
attempt to determine what decision a California court might reach
in response to future challenges of California Penal Code section
646.9, this section will examine various arguments that have been
raised by some commentators against that statute.
157. Id. An amendment to section 646.9 of the California Penal Code has been proposed which
would add to the definition of stalking, the willful and malicious following of another person to a
battered womens' shelter, or the harassment of another person by approaching a battered womens'
shelter, and making a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death
or great bodily injury to that person or that person's immediate family. 1993 C.A. A.B. 284. The bill
would create a presumption that a victim who has sought the refuge of a battered womens' shelter
is under a credible threat. Id. Another proposed amendment would increase the penalty for a person
who commits a second or subsequent violation of California Penal Code section 646.9 against the
same victim and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence to two, three, or four
years and a fine up to $10,000. 1993 C.A. A.B. 303; see also Nightline, supra note 21.
158. See World News Tonight, supra note 2 (providing the criticism of Jeffrey Weiner from the
Defense Lawyer Association that anti-stalking laws are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad). See
generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8-16.9, at 944-950
(1991) (discussing the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines); see also infra notes 192-236
and accompanying text (discussing the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines as applied to California
Penal Code section 646.9).
159. Telephone Interview with Andrew Diamond, Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, CA
(Sept. 29, 1992) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
160. Id.
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A. Adequacy of Restraining Orders
Some commentators have argued that California Penal Code
section 646.9 is unnecessary because a violation of an injunction
may result in arrest and criminal prosecution.' 61 In addition,
injunctions provide some protection against false accusations
because a court will only issue them when sufficient evidence is
presented.' 62 Critics claim that California Penal Code section
646.9 circumvents these protections by removing the requirement
that a judge evaluate the threat and issue an order.163. Critics
argue that this very minimal judicial evaluation should be made
before allowing an arrest for a criminal violation, especially when
that violation is punishable as a felony. l6
Although injunctions provide for judicial evaluation prior to an
arrest, they have proven to be an inadequate remedy for victims of
domestic violence, a crime similar to stalking in that the majority
of stalking victims are stalked by former spouses or lovers.165 For
similary reasons, injunctions are inadequate to protect victims of
stalking. One reason that injunctions have been inadequate to pro-
tect victims of domestic violence is that courts have for a long time
followed a public policy of respecting family privacy.166 In fact,
society has only recently begun to recognize the problem of domes-
161. Letter from Melissa K. Nappan, Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice, to Edward Royce, California State Senator (Apr. 11, 1990) (on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (opposing the enactment of California Penal Code § 646.9).
162. Id.; see supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting the clear and convincing burden
of proof required under California's harassment injunction statute).
163. Letter from Melissa K. Nappan, Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice, to Edward Royce, California State Senator (Apr. 11, 1990) (on file with the Pacific Law
Journal).
164. Id.
165. World News Tonight, supra note 2.
166. See Terry L. Fromson, Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U.
L. REv. & Soc. CHANGE 135 & n.3, 151 & n.106 (1977). In 1868, a North Carolina court held that
it would not interfere with family government except in extreme circumstances, because the evil
which would result from doing so would be greater than the "lesser evil of trifling violence." Id. at
135 & n.3. In fact, until the early twentieth century, laws permitted men to beat their wives. Id. at
n.2.
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tic violence. 67 Moreover, injunctions may be difficult to obtain
and are often short in duration.168 Nevertheless, police recom-
mend that stalking victims obtain injunctions because they obligate
the criminal justice system to hold offenders accountable once their
actions are restricted. 169 However, this recommendation is quali-
fied in that injunctions are mere pieces of paper, useless to "stop
a bullet," and dependent on adequate enforcement.7 Therefore,
injunctions by themselves are inadequate to protect victims of
stalking and are merely one tool available for victims to use.'71
B. Comparison of California Penal Code 646.9 to Traditional
Criminal Provisions
Like injunctions, criminal statutes have provided inadequate
measures of relief to harassment victims primarily because some
states have yet to enact criminal harassment statutes. 72 As a
result, victims of harassment go unprotected in some states.
171
Even when states have enacted criminal statutes, they share charac-
teristics which make them inherently inadequate. First, criminal
conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by
167. Nadine Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative
Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HoFMA L. REV. 95 (1980) (noting that America has only
recently discovered the problem of violence between cohabitating adults). In the 1978 Senate
Hearings, it was estimated that between 1.8 and 3.3 million women per year were beaten by their
husbands. Id. at n.5 (quoting from Domestic Violence and Legislation with Respect to Domestic
Violence: Hearings on S. 1728 before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant
John Lane, Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles Police Department (May 20, 1993) (stating that
law enforcement has progressed dramatically in the last five years in recognizing domestic problems
and identified a lack of sensitivity and appreciation of women's rights issues).
168. See supra notes 102-119 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of injunctive
relief).
169. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant John Lane, Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles
Police Department (May 20, 1993).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Gunderson, supra note 67, at 228-29 (asserting that the police will be unable to give
a victim assistance if the harassing conduct does not fit within a criminal statute). Where no
applicable criminal statute exists, the traumatic experience caused by the harassment, as well as the
harassment itself, is prolonged while the victim seeks civil remedies. Id.; see also supra notes 123-
133 and accompanying text (discussing harassment statutes in various states).
173. See Gunderson, supra note 67, at 217.
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lower standards such as those in civil proceedings.' 74 Second,
until the assailant has been convicted, the assailant might be
released on bond, allowing for the possibility of continued harass-
ment. 7' Third, the effectiveness of criminal remedies depends on
adequate police enforcement. 76 In the past, when the crime com-
mitted was against women, as stalking often is,"7 police and pro-
secutors were criticized for their failure to enforce applicable crim-
inal laws. 78 Finally, criminal harassment statutes are susceptible
to constitutional challenges on void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
grounds.
179
In addition to these problems, some statutes are so narrowly
drafted that they afford protection in only certain circumstances.
174. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional protections afforded
a defendant in criminal cases but not civil cases).
175. See Topliffe, supra note 96, at 1047 (discussing domestic violence cases and noting that
when victims only seek criminal sanctions, the defendants often are released on bond, thereby having
the opportunity to intimidate the victims into not testifying or impressing upon the victims that the
abuse will continue if they persist in pressing charges).
176. See AJ.R., supra note 62, at 515; Cook, supra note 69, at 267 (noting that one reason for
the ineffectiveness of assault statutes is delayed police response); cf supra notes 161-172 and
accompanying text (discussing practical and societal problems reghrding enforcing injunctions).
177. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text (discussing the general characteristics of
the behavior of stalking).
178. See Taub, supra note 167, at 96 (stating that police and prosecutors minimize the
seriousness of crimes against women). It has been shown that often the police might not respond until
it is too late, and violence has already occured. See Topliffe, supra note 96, at 1046 & n.62 (noting
that the police often refuse to arrest a defendant, even if found in the victim's home, if no violence
has occurred). Frequently, woman abuse calls have been assigned a low priority status. Fromson,
supra note 166, at 144 (noting that the legal system gives the police discretion to make decisions
which reflect and perpetuate misconceptions of sexual roles and family privacy). Some calls are
"screened out" and never responded to officially. Id. (stating that police officers seem to view family
violence as non-criminal, and that this attitude along with the physical danger posed by intervention
has discouraged police involvement in cases of woman abuse). Even when the police do respond,
they rarely make an arrest or take any action to protect the woman from future harm. Id. at 145.
Police training manuals often advise against making an arrest. Id. (citing the Michigan Police
Training Academy procedure as recommending that the police officer avoid arrest if possible and
appeal to the vanity of the parties by explaining to them, among other things, the time and cost
involved in obtaining an arrest warrant). The end result is that when law enforcement is inadequate,
defendants feel that they can continue to harass their victims without risk. Topliffe, supra note 96,
at 1046 (suggesting that monitoring of enforcement of injunctions is necessary to better protect
victims).
179. See AJ.R., supra note 62, at 516 (noting that harassment statutes are often challenged on
vagueness and overbreadth grounds); see also infra notes 192-236 and accompanying text (discussing




For example, the principal difference between California Penal
Code section 646.9, California's anti-stalking statute, and California
Penal Code section 240, California's assault statute, is that the for-
mer does not require a present ability to cause great bodily injury
or death, but only an apparent ability to do so.180 As a result, a
person who, from a distance, makes a credible threat to a victim
might be in violation of the stalking law, provided that the other
statutory elements are met,181 and yet might not be in violation
of the assault statute. 182 This distinction has caused some critics
of California's anti-stalking statute to claim that requiring only an
apparent ability, rather than an immediate present ability, to cause
bodily harm or death allows liability to turn on the victim's sub-
jective belief regarding the nature of the threat. 83 The plain
meaning of California Penal Code section 646.9, however, limits
the scope of liability because the victim's fear must be reason-
able.'" Yet, Los Angeles police claim that section 646.9 is too
limited because the requirement of some type of threat leaves vic-
tims unprotected against other types of menacing behavior.85
180. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a),(t) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting the willful,
malicious and repeated following or harassing of another person and the making of a credible threat
with intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury; a credible threat
is defined as one made against the life of the victim, or to cause great bodily injury to the victim,
and is made with the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the victim to
reasonably fear for their own safety) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1988) (defining assault as
an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another).
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a stalker as any person who
willfully, maliciously and repeatedly follows or harasses another person in addition to making a
credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury).
182. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (discussing the presentability requirement
of section 240 of the California Penal Code).
183. Letter from Margaret Pena, Legislative Director, and Francisco Lobaco, Legislative
Advocate, American Civil Liberties Union, to Edward Royce, California State Senator (Apr. 11,
1990) (on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (opposing the enactment of California Penal Code §
646.9).
184. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring the victim to be placed in
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury to either the victim or a member of the victim's
immediate family); see supra notes 150-158 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
California Penal Code section 646.9).
185. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant John Lane, Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles
Police Department (May 20, 1993) (noting that the Los Angeles Police Department's Threat
Management Unit has dealt with 208 cases since it was created, but only 10 of them have led to
1971
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In situations where an offender has not committed any physical
act, both California Penal Code section 240 and section 646.9 are
inadequate. In those situations, victims may look to section 422 of
the California Penal Code which prohibits threatening another per-
son with death or great bodily injury.18 6 Unlike California Penal
Code section 646.9, section 422 does not require any physical act,
such as repeated following or harassing.8 7 Nor does section 422
require a present ability to carry out the threat, as does the assault
statute. 8 8 Hence, section 422 seems to be the broadest of all
three statutes and the most likely statute to reach the greatest num-
ber of offenders.
With the existence of alternative penal statutes having fewer
requirements than those mandated in California Penal Code section
646.9, one might question the need for California's stalking statute.
Lieutenant John Lane of the Los Angeles Police Department's
Threat Management Unit has suggested that statutes such as
California Penal Code section 420 (assault) and section 422
(threats) prohibit certain behaviors, which together, comprise the
crime of stalking.'8 9 Unfortunately these "lesser" offenses have
not been taken seriously in the past by prosecutors and judges.'
90
Thus, Lieutenant Lane believes that California Penal Code section
646.9 is necessary because it puts law enforcement officials on
notice that stalking is an important societal problem and is to be
taken seriously. 9'
stalking arrests primarily due to the restrictiveness of the credible threat requirement of section 646.9
of the California Penal Code); World News Tonight, supra note 2 (noting that only threats of physical
harm are considered to be a crime, and that defendants often do not expressly make these threats to
their victims); see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (explaining that, of the different types
of mental disorders suffered by stalkers, those with erotomania are more likely to engage in stalking,
but less likely to threaten or physically harm the victim).
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West Supp. 1993); see supra notes 143-148 and accompanying
text (discussing section 422 of the California Penal Code).
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text (discussing section 240 of the California
Penal Code).
189. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant John Lane, Threat Management Unit, Los Angeles
Police Department (May 20, 1993) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
190. Id.
191. Id. (stating that section 646.9 of the California Penal Code "forces the issue" and makes
prosecutors and judges take the crime of stalking seriously).
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C. Constitutional Challenges to California Penal Code Section
646.9 on Vagueness and Overbreadth Grounds
Many critics have claimed that California Penal Code section
646.9 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide pos-
sible offenders with adequate notice of what it prohibits.192
Critics are concerned that certain legal behavior will be indistin-
guishable from illegal behavior, and that people conducting legiti-
mate surveillance within the scope of their employment might be
subject to the felony penalties of section 646.9.193 Among these
people are insurance adjusters, law enforcement officers, repos-
sessors, private investigators, and newspaper reporters. 4
Although no court has reached a decision as to whether
California Penal Code section 646.9 is sufficiently specific to pro-
vide fair warning to potential defendants of what conduct is pro-
hibited, California courts have upheld the validity of other criminal
statutes which have been similarly attacked as being too vague to
provide fair warning.1 15 For instance, loitering statutes, which
prohibit persons from wandering about in public places, have been
challenged because of the possibility that they may be used to
punish mere presence.1 6 In response to these attacks, California
has imposed additional requirements such as a specific intent to
solicit or engage in criminal conduct."9 In People v. Superior
192. See, e.g., World News Tonight, supra note 2 (providing the criticism of Jeffrey Weiner
from the Defense Lawyers Association that anti-stalking laws are unconstitutionally vague).
193. Letter from W. Craig Biddle, Partner, Biddle & Hamilton, to Edward Royce, California
State Senator (March 26, 1990) (criticizing California Penal Code § 646.9) (on file with the Pacific
Law Journal).
194. Id.
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1993) (defining the crime of loitering); see
infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionality of loitering statutes).
196. Pamela Sirkin, Comment, The EvanescentActusReus Requirement: California Penal Code
§ 647(d) - Criminal Liability for "Loitering with Intent .... Is Punishment for Merely Thinking
Certain Thoughts While Loitering Constitutional?, 19 Sw. U. L. RElv. 165, 167 (1990) (noting that
many loitering statutes have failed because they elevate mere status to a criminal offense and are
among those statutes that are most likely to be found unconstitutional).
197. See CAL. PEMAL CODE § 647(d) (West Supp. 1993) (making it a misdemeanor for a person
to loiter in or about any toilet open to the public for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting any
lewd or lascivious or any unlawful act); see also Sirkin, supra note 196, at 165-66 (discussing the
constitutionality of loitering statutes).
1973
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 24
Court (Caswell),'98 the California Supreme Court noted that the
United States Supreme Court has on many occasions emphasized
the value of a specific intent requirement in overcoming a vague-
ness challenge.'
California Penal Code section 646.9 is similar to the California
loitering statute upheld in Caswell because it requires a specific
intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or great bodily
injury.m In addition, section 646.9 is very specific about the type
of conduct it prohibits.201 A stalker must repeatedly follow or
harass the victim and must make a credible threat with the intent
and apparent ability to carry out that threat.02 Thus, not only
must the defendant possess a specific intent but the defendant must
also perform some affirmative act.203 Therefore, only those per-
sons who repeatedly harass and threaten others will be subject to
liability. The credible threat requirement essentially negates the risk
that someone who was merely conducting surveillance would be
subject to liability under section 646.9.204 However, it is unlikely
that a victim would be placed in reasonable fear from legitimate
198. 46 Cal. 3d 381, 758 P.2d 1046, 250 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1988). The California Supreme Court
upheld California's loitering statute against a void-for-vagueness attack. Id. at 402,758 P.2d at 1058,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 527. The court noted that the statute was not impermissibly vague due to the use
of the word "loiter," because the word itself connotes a sinister purpose of lingering in a particular
place for the purpose of committing a crime. Id. at 390, 758 P.2d at 1049, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 518. In
addition, the court recognized that California Penal Code section 647(d) has a specific intent
requirement so that the statute is only violated when a person loiters about for the purpose of
engaging in or soliciting lewd, lascivious, or unlawful acts; thus, persons of ordinary intelligence need
not guess at the applicability of the statute. Id. at 390-91,758 P.2d at 1049-50, 250 Cal. Rptr at 518-
19.
199. See id. at 391,758 P.2d at 1050,250 Cal. Rptr. at 519 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) as one case where the United States Supreme Court held that
a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of
notice given to the defendant in regard to which conduct is proscribed).
200. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a stalker as any
person who willfully, maliciously, or repeatedly follows or harasses another person in addition to
making a credible threat with intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily
injury) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring the purpose of engaging in
any lewd, lascivious, or unlawful act).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Press Release No. 37, Ed Royce, California State Senator, Apr. 24, 1990 (supporting
section 646.9 of the California Penal Code).
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types of surveillance activities. It seems probable, therefore, that
California Penal Code section 646.9 will be found to provide fair
notice.
Besides providing fair notice, statutes must also specify objec-
tive ways for the police and the judiciary to judge the defendant's
conduct.' °5 One section of California's loitering statute was held
to be unconstitutionally vague because it gave police officers too
much discretion in deciding whether someone had violated the vag-
rancy law.2  A few years later, however, the California Supreme
Court upheld a different section of California's loitering statute
which proscribed loitering but had the requirement that the defen-
20dant possess a certain specific intent. 07 The court found that the
statute limited the discretion of enforcing officials by narrowing the
statute's reach to those persons who loiter with a specific illegal
purpose. °8
California Penal Code section 646.9 is similar to the loitering
statute in that it limits the reach of the statute to those persons who
have a specific illegal purpose which is objectively manifested to
the victim.0 9 These requirements, that a credible threat be mani-
fested toward the victim and that the threat be such as to reason-
ably cause the victim to fear for the victim's safety, leave little
subjective discretion to the police. Because of these similarities to
205. Sirkin, supra note 196, at 177-178 (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
206. See Kolander v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (finding section 647(e) of the
California Penal Code, which prohibits persons from wandering about the streets without apparent
reason and from refusing to identify themselves and to account for their presence when requested by
a police officer, to be impermissibly vague because it gave police officers virtually complete
discretion to determine whether defendants had satisfied the statute's requirement that they present
credible and reliable identification when stopped by the police); see also Nightline, supra note 21
(noting that many vagrancy laws were struck down because police were given too much discretion
to determine when a person was in violation of the law).
207. Superior Court (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d at 402, 758 P.2d at 1058, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 527
(holding that section 647(d) of the California Penal Code was not impermissibly vague); see supra
notes 198-199 and accompanying text (discussing the Caswell case).
208. Id. at 394, 758 P.2d at 1052, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (noting that a person may be arrested
only if the person's conduct leads to a finding of probable cause that the person is loitering about
a public restroom with the proscribed illicit intent).
209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring the offender to make a
credible threat to the victim with the intent that it place the person in reasonable fear of death or
great bodily injury).
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the recently upheld loitering statute, it is likely that section 646.9
will also be deemed to provide objective ways for the police and
the judiciary to determine if the defendant's conduct violates sec-
tion 646.9. Thus, it seems likely that section 646.9 has sufficient
specificity and limited official discretion necessary to withstand a
void-for-vagueness attack.
Even if a court were to find California Penal Code section
646.9 impermissibly vague, it would be possible to find an ade-
quate saving construction.210 In People v. Blake,21' a California
Court of Appeal held that a statute is sufficiently certain if it
employs words of long usage or with a common-law meaning, or
which can be made reasonably certain by reference to a diction-
ary.212 If a statute contains a reasonably adequate disclosure of
legislative intent regarding the evil it combats, a court will not
readily find the statute too indefinite for the police and judiciary to
enforce. 2 3 In ascertaining legislative intent, a court will consider
not only the statutory language, but also the object of the legis-
lation, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public
policy, and any other helpful matters.
214
The Legislative history of California Penal Code section 646.9
provides a clear understanding of the statutes purpose. The law was
enacted following numerous murders which were committed by
stalkers. 1 5 In addition, these murders and others stemming from
similar circumstances, as well as the general behavioral traits
associated with stalking, have been extremely well-publicized by
the news media. These reports provide more notice of what the
statute prohibits than the words of the statute themselves. In
210. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
211. 179 Cal. App. 2d 246, 3 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1960).
212. Id. at 252, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 753-54.
213. Id.
214. Clinton v. County of Santa Cruz, 119 Cal. App. 3d 927, 933-34, 174 Cal. Rptr. 296, 298-
99 (1981) (setting forth the factors a court should consider in ascertaining legislative intent). A court
should keep in mind the nature and purpose of a statute in order to interpret it in a manner consistent
with its purpose. Id.
215. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the motivation behind the statute).
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addition, the terms of the statute have common meanings. 1"
Moreover, California Penal Code section 646.9 itself defines some
of its terms.217 Thus, even if California Penal Code section 646.9
is found to be vague, it is very likely that a court could save the
statute by applying a saving construction.
In addition to being challenged on void-for-vagueness grounds,
California Penal Code section 646.9 has also been criticized on
overbreadth grounds. 218 An analogy will be made to telephone
harassment statutes because these statutes contain language similar
to California Penal Code section 646.9.219 In Oregon v.
Moyle,22° the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a section of
Oregon's telephone harassment statute which prohibits anyone from
intentionally harassing or annoying another person by conveying a
threat to inflict serious physical injury that will cause the person to
become alarmed.22 The court reasoned that the statute is not over-
broad because it does not prohibit the mere communication of a
threat to another person by telephone, but makes it illegal to
216. See, e.g., People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689, 692 (Colo. 1985) (holding that the words
"likely" and "alarm" in a criminal statute were not impermissibly vague and provided an identifiable
standard of conduct to a person of reasonable intelligence through reference to a dictionary).
217. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1993) (defining "course of conduct"
as a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing
a continuity of purpose). The term "harasses" is defined as a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves
no legitimate purpose. Id. "Credible threat" is defined as a threat made with the intent and apparent
ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the target to reasonably fear for the victim's own safety
or that of the victim's immediate family. Id. at § 646.9(0 (West Supp. 1993).
218. Letter from Margaret Pena, Legislative Director, and Francisco Lobaco, Legislative
Advocate, American Civil Liberties Union, to Senator Edward Royce, California State Senator (Apr.
11, 1990) (on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (criticizing California's anti-stalking law as
overbroad); see supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the overbreadth doctrine); but see
Maine v. Cropley, 544 A.2d 302, 304-305 (Me. 1988) (holding that speech prohibited by a
harassment statute forbidding persons from engaging in any course of conduct with the intent to
harass, torment, or threaten another person after having been forbidden to do so by a law enforcement
officer and without reasonable cause, was unprotected "fighting words").
219. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text (discussing telephone harassment
statutes).
220. 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985).
221. OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065(1)(c) (1991); see Oregon v. Moyle, 705 P.2d at 745 (noting
that the statute focuses on the potential effect of the threat and harm to another person, rather than
speech itself).
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subject another person to alarm by conveying a telephonic
threat.222 Thus, the statute does not punish a person who con-
veyed a telephonic threat, even if the person did so with a specific
intent, unless the threat also had the effect of reasonably alarming
the victim.' It is the effect on the victim that the statute pro-
hibits, and speech is merely the means of achieving that forbidden
effect.
224
Similarly, in People v. Hernandez,2" a California Court of
Appeal upheld California's telephone harassment statute.2 6 The
court found that statute was not overbroad because it forbids partic-
ular conduct rather than speech itself." The court held that
where a statute is narrowly drawn to protect a legitimate state
interests, and proscribes conduct and not merely speech, the over-
breadth must be substantial in order for the statute to be
stricken."28 There must be a realistic danger that the statute will
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protec-
229tions.
California Penal Code section 646.9 proscribes conduct which,
similar to telephone harassment, may be accomplished through the
use of speech. Section 646.9 makes it unlawful for a person to
repeatedly harass another person, which may include telephone har-
222. OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065(I)(c) (1991) (prohibiting a person from intentionally subjecting
another person to alarm by conveying a telephonic threat to inflict serious physical injury on that
person or to commit a felony involving the person or property of that person or any member of that
person's family, which threat reasonably would be expected to cause alarm).
223. Moyle, 705 P.2d at 745 (stating that harm to another person is the focus of the statute).
224. See id. (noting that the forbidden effect of the subsection is actual and reasonable alarm).
225. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1376, 283 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1991).
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West Supp. 1993) (making it unlawful to intentionally annoy
by telephoning another person and addressing to or about that person, any obscene language or threat
to inflict injury upon the person or the person's property or any member of the person's family or
by making repeated telephone calls to that person).
227. People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1376, 1381, 283 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (1991) (noting
that the statute is not directed at prohibiting certain caller viewpoints).
228. Id. at 1381, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (stating that the overbreadth must be judged in relation
to its plainly legitimate sweep). A statute will not be deemed overly broad merely because some
impermissible applications can be conceived. Id. at 1381-82, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (giving examples
of constitutionally protected telephone calls, as telephoning to threaten to tow away someone's car,
or threatening to return items to a department store and demand reimbursement).
229. Henmandez, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1381, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
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assment.23 In addition, the stalker must make a credible threat to
the victim, which may also be done verbally." Thus, before sec-
tion 646.9 will be stricken, a defendant must show that the statute
is substantially overbroad.
Using the same reasoning followed in Hernandez and Moyle,
California Penal Code section 646.9 would not be overly broad
merely because it makes certain speech illegal. Speech is only one
type of conduct prohibited by section 646.9. The harassment of
another person made illegal by section 646.9 is not limited solely
to speech activity but may also include physical conduct, such as
leaving gifts for the victim or repeatedly following the victim.
212
Hernandez held that for a statute to be substantially overbroad
there must be a realistic danger that it will significantly compro-
mise First Amendment protections." A court will probably not
find California Penal Code section 646.9 substantially overbroad
because section 646.9 does not compromise First Amendment
rights any more significantly than does California Penal Code
section 653(m), California's telephone harassment statute which
was upheld in Hernandez. A telephone harassment statute will
necessarily encroach more significantly upon speech because the
only practical way to harass another person using a telephone, aside
from repeatedly letting the telephone ring or refusing to respond,
is to communicate through speech. On the other hand, a stalker has
an almost infinite variety of nonverbal ways to harass another per-
son, such as following the victim, sending the victim gifts, or
coming into physical contact with the victim.
In addition, California Penal Code section 646.9, by its terms,
does not make speech itself illegal but focuses on the harm caused
to victims.' In this respect, section 646.9 is remarkably similar
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993).
231. Id.
232. Id.; see supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text (illustrating several case histories of
stalking).
233. Hernandez, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1381, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
234. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting the willful, malicious, and
repeated following or harassing of another person, in addition to the making of a credible threat with
the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury).
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to the statutes in Hernandez and Moyle. 5 All three of the
statutes prohibit intentional conduct on the part of the defendant,
including the making of a threat to another person."3 6 Thus,
because California Penal Code section 646.9 prohibits more than
mere speech, and aside from the fact that a threat in violation of a
telephone harassment statute must obviously be conveyed only
through a telephone, the threat requirements of the statutes are
sufficiently similar to successfully argue that California Penal Code
section 646.9 is likewise not overly broad.
IV. CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that stalking is a crime based on obses-
sions. Because an obsession often transcends respect for the law,
there is little that any law can do to adequately deter a person from
stalking another person. The threat of a civil tort action, such as
invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress,
will no more deter a stalker than will waving an injunction in front
of the stalker. Moreoever, criminal remedies have proven to be
similarly inadequate for deterring harassment, especially in states
which do not have a statute aimed specifically at harassment. Thus,
many hope that the recent anti-stalking legislation passed in various
states across the country will do more to protect victims of stalking
than other more traditional remedies. Even if the stalking laws
serve no other purpose, they make the crime of stalking a felony
and punishable by longer imprisonment. This allows victims time
to put their lives back together and to take precautions to protect
their personal safety.
Kelli L. Attinello
235. Compare id. (prohibiting the willful, malicious, and repeated following or harassing of
another person, in addition to the making of a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or bodily injury) with OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065(1)(c) (1991) (prohibiting
a person from intentionally harassing or annoying another person by subjecting that person to alarm
by conveying a telephonic threat to inflict serious physical injury on that person) and CAL. PENAL
CODE § 653(a) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting a person from intentionally annoying another person
by telephoning that person and addressing to that person any obscene language or threat to inflict
injury upon that person, that person's property, or any member of that person's family).
236. See supra note 235.
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